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in the United States do a poor job of disclosing to investors how climate change affects their
businesses. Although there have been several proposals for more voluntary disclosure of these
risks and one petition for guidance from the SEC, these proposals are not effecting changes in
disclosure practices quickly enough. This Article builds on existing proposals to create guidelines
for mandatory climate change risk disclosure in periodic securities filings. The guidelines seek to
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WARMING UP TO CLIMATE CHANGE RISK 
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Jeffrey M. McFarland* 
ABSTRACT 
Investors are clamoring for companies to include more climate 
change risk disclosure in their periodic reports filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Yet public companies 
in the United States do a poor job of disclosing to investors how 
climate change affects their businesses.  Although there have been 
several proposals for more voluntary disclosure of these risks and 
one petition for guidance from the SEC, these proposals are not 
effecting changes in disclosure practices quickly enough.  This 
Article builds on existing proposals to create guidelines for 
mandatory climate change risk disclosure in periodic securities 
filings.  The guidelines seek to provide investors with meaningful 
disclosure, without overburdening the companies making the 
disclosure.  This framework could be used by the SEC in formulating 
guidance regarding climate change risk disclosure under existing 
disclosure rules, or in creating new rules mandating the disclosure. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Public companies in the United States do a poor job of disclosing to 
investors how climate change affects their businesses.1  Despite repeated 
requests from investor groups for more disclosure, and despite in-
creasing public interest in the effects of global warming, poor disclosure 
*   Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. 
 1. See AM. LAW INST., CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE BY THE S&P 500, 186 (2007) 
[hereinafter CERES REPORT].  The report was commissioned by CERES, a national 
coalition of investors, environmental groups and other organizations, and Calvert, an 
institutional investor.  See also PETITION FOR INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON CLIMATE 
RISK DISCLOSURE 2 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-
547.pdf [hereinafter CLIMATE RISK PETITION]. 
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persists.2  This Article summarizes some of the efforts to improve dis-
closure of climate change risks, and recommends elements of a manda-
tory disclosure system for climate change risk disclosure under the 
securities laws. 
Climate change issues are regularly featured in the pages of the 
New York Times and on public radio programs.3  It was a topic of debate 
among candidates for president in 2008.4  Al Gore’s film An 
Inconvenient Truth, which sought to raise awareness of global warming 
worldwide, won an Academy Award in 2007 for best documentary 
feature.5  Gore also won a share of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007, along 
with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for their 
“efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made 
climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are 
needed to counteract such change.”6 
The IPCC describes climate system warming as “unequivocal” and 
very likely the result of greenhouse gas concentrations (“GHGs”).7  In 
 2. See infra notes 3-6, 13-20 and accompanying text. 
 3. See, e.g., Long Hwa-Shu, Bank Takes Environmental Step Into Rural Town, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at C7; Felicity Barringer & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Prominent 
Green Group to Help Buyout Firm, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2008, at C1; Megan Williams, 
Carriers Afraid They’ll Cough Up for CO2, MARKETPLACE, Dec. 21, 2007, available at 
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/12/21/eu_new_co2_airplane_law/; 
Richard Harris, Businesses See Green in Iceland’s Volcano Power, NATIONAL PUBLIC 
RADIO WEEKEND EDITION SATURDAY, Dec. 3, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=17548004; Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.N. Report on 
Climate Details Risks of Inaction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at A1. 
 4. See Edmund L. Andrews, When Fuel and Politics Mix, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 
2007, at C1; see also BarackObama.com, New Energy for America,  http://www.barack 
obama.com/issues/energy/ (last visited July 2, 2008); JohnMcCain.com, John McCain’s 
Principles for Climate Policy, http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/Issues/da151a1c-
733a-4dc1-9cd3-f9ca5caba1de.htm (last visited July 2, 2008). 
 5. See Norman Mayersohn, Two Steps Greener, One Back, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
2007, § 10, at 12. 
 6. See Nobelprize.org, The Nobel Peace Prize 2007, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_ 
prizes/peace/laureates/2007/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 7. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 1, 2 (Nov. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [hereinafter IPCC 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT].  The IPCC is a group of hundreds of scientists from countries 
that are members of the World Meteorological Organization or the United Nations 
Environment Programme.  It was created as a source of objective information about 
global warming, and is made available to policymakers for purposes of evaluating the 
social and economic impacts of global warming.  See About IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
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its Climate Change 2007 report, the IPCC states “[t]here is high 
agreement and much evidence that with current climate change mitiga-
tion policies and related sustainable development practices, global GHG 
emissions will continue to grow over the next few decades.”8  Moreover, 
climate change is likely to “lead to some impacts that are abrupt or ire-
versible, depending upon the rate and magnitude of climate change.”9 
Global warming is also gaining traction among governmental 
bodies.  The United States Supreme Court recently stated: 
The harms associated with climate change are serious and well 
recognized. The Government’s own objective assessment of the 
relevant science and a strong consensus among qualified experts 
indicate that global warming threatens, inter alia, a precipitate rise in 
sea levels, severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems, a 
significant reduction in winter snowpack with direct and important 
economic consequences, and increases in the spread of disease and 
the ferocity of weather events.10 
In October 2007, Senators Joe Lieberman (D-CT) and John Warner 
(R-VA) introduced the America’s Climate Security Act of 2007 after 
approval by a senate subcommittee.11  America’s Climate Security Act 
is designed to direct the Environmental Protection Agency to adopt 
programs to address GHG emissions.12 
In short, climate change is a daily topic of conversation, and is re-
cognized as one of the most significant issues of our time by the media, 
government, and scientific, international, and business communities.13  
Although skeptics remain, human contribution to the harmful effects of 
climate change is gaining increasing acceptance with each passing 
year.14 
about/index.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 8. IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 7. 
 9. Id. at 13. 
 10. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1442 (2007).  Four of the justices 
dissented with respect to the outcome of the case, but Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion 
did not dispute the quoted phrase, despite acknowledging uncertainties associated with 
determining the specific causes.  Id. at 1471, 1474-75. 
 11. S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 12. Id. § 3. 
 13. See, e.g., CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at i; DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREW S. 
WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD:  HOW SMART COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 
TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE, AND BUILD COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (2006); GOV’T 
INSTS., INC., THE GREENING OF AMERICAN BUSINESS:  MAKING BOTTOM-LINE SENSE OF 
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Investor groups wonder how climate change affects the businesses 
in which they have invested.  Investors have been calling for voluntary 
disclosure about environmental policies for nearly two decades.15  Yet in 
2000, Kimberly O’Neill Packard and Forest L. Reinhardt wrote in the 
Harvard Business Review: “Surprisingly few companies make public 
statements – or even have pages on their Web sites – about how they are 
dealing with climate change.”16  In 2007, a study by a group of insti-
tutional investors found that “disclosure practices among the nation’s 
500 largest companies are severely lacking.”17  The group urged public 
companies to voluntarily disclose climate change risk in a more mean-
ingful way.18  In September 2007, a separate group of institutional in-
vestors, environmental organizations and governmental officers peti-
tioned the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
release guidance for reporting climate change issues under existing man-
datory disclosure rules and regulations.19  And, at the company level, 
shareholders frequently submit proposals relating to climate change dis-
closure for inclusion in annual proxy statements.20 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE 
GREENING OF AMERICAN BUSINESS]. 
 14. A law journal article is not the proper forum for discussing the underlying 
science of climate change.  Despite pockets of skepticism, the author assumes the over-
whelming trend is accurate, and that climate change is a serious risk to the planet.  Not 
everyone agrees of course.  For two examples:  The founder of The Weather Channel, 
John Coleman, currently a meteorologist at a San Diego television affiliate, has exa-
mined the science and believes global warming “is the greatest scam in history.”  John 
Coleman, Global Warming Is a Scam, available at http://www.kusi.com/weather/ 
colemanscorner/11621966.html.  Christopher C. Horner, a Senior Fellow at the Compe-
titive Enterprise Institute, believes the attention given to global warming is indicative of 
alarmist behavior.  CHRISTOPHER C. HORNER, THE POLITICALLY INCORRECT GUIDE TO 
GLOBAL WARMING AND ENVIRONMENTALISM (2007).  Then there are groups like the 
Free Enterprise Action Fund, which, regardless of the science, believes corporate social 
responsibility to be “anti-business.” Free Enterprise Action Fund, http://www.freeenter 
priseactionfund.com/advocacy.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 15. Mark A. White, Effect of the Green Movement on Investors, in THE GREENING 
OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 13, at 47-50. 
 16. Kimberly O’Neill Packard & Forest L Reinhardt, What Every Executive Needs 
to Know About Global Warming, HARV. BUS. R. (July-Aug. 2000),129, 134, reprinted 
in HARVARD BUS. SCH. PRESS, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON GREEN BUSINESS 
STRATEGY (2007). 
 17. See CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at ii. 
 18. Id. 
 19. CLIMATE RISK PETITION, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
 20. See, e.g., OGE Energy, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 541778 (Feb. 27, 
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This Article argues for mandatory disclosure of climate change 
risks in periodic reports filed under the securities laws, which are avail-
able to the investing public through the SEC’s website.21  Part I of this 
Article will briefly review the current framework of periodic mandatory 
disclosure under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange 
Act”), and the associated rules as they may relate to climate change risk 
disclosure.22  Part II discusses the current state of climate change risk 
disclosure, and some of the reasons underlying the reluctance to increase 
climate change disclosure.  Part III describes current attempts to im-
prove disclosure of climate risks, through both voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure proposals.  This Part also includes a critique of the proposed 
systems, as well as a discussion about whether climate change risk ought 
to be the subject of SEC guidance or rulemaking.  Finally, Part IV builds 
on the existing proposals to suggest a framework for periodic mandatory 
disclosure that the SEC should use in publishing guidance under existing 
securities laws, or as the basis for adopting additional rules governing a 
company’s periodic reporting. 
PART I. SECURITIES DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK 
A. Disclosure Required in Public Company Reports 
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act requires all issuers of registered 
securities to file periodic reports with the SEC, and grants the SEC rule-
making authority to prescribe the form and content of those reports.23  
The periodic reports required to be filed by issuers under Section 13(a) 
 
2008); Pulte Homes, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 384377 (Feb. 11, 2008). Their 
efforts have met with varying degrees of success.  Compare OGE Energy, SEC No-
Action Letter, 2008 WL 541778 (Feb. 27, 2008) (allowing OGE Energy to exclude a 
proposal asking for a board of directors report about how the company is assessing the 
impact of climate change on the business) with Pulte Homes, SEC No-Action Letter, 
2008 WL 384377 (Feb. 11, 2008) (rejecting Pulte Homes’ request to exclude a proposal 
asking for a board of directors report about the feasibility of the company developing 
policies that will minimize the company’s impact on climate change). 
 21. The SEC maintains a database of periodic filings submitted to the SEC known 
as “EDGAR.”  SEC, Researching Public Companies Through EDGAR: A Guide For 
Investors, http://www.sec.gov/invstor/pubs/edgarguide.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).  
The EDGAR database can be searched at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/web 
users.htm. 
 22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2007). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2007). 
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and the associated rules include the annual report on Form 10-K,24 and 
quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, among others.25 
Forms 10-Q and 10-K are scarcely forms at all, at least not as the 
term is commonly understood.  While they provide a framework for the 
required disclosure, they explicitly state in their instructions that they are 
not blank forms, but rather “guide cop[ies]” to be used in preparing the 
periodic reports.26  Instead, Forms 10-Q and 10-K refer to Regulation S-
K, adopted by the SEC in connection with the filing of forms under the 
Exchange Act and the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”).27  
Regulation S-K provides a more detailed set of guidelines for disclosure 
in the quarterly and annual reports, but is broad enough to maintain 
flexibility across a wide range of business activities. 
Both the quarterly and annual reports require the issuer to disclose 
information about the company’s financial condition, results of opera-
tions and legal proceedings, and risks to which the company is subject.28  
The annual report further requires a discussion of the business develop-
ments at the company.29  Those matters implicate Items 101, 103, 303 
and 503(c) of Regulation S-K, and the company’s audited financial 
statements.30  A brief description of each of those items follows. 
 24. Requirements of Annual Reports, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2007). 
 25. Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Form 10-QSB, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 
(2007).  Issuers also must file current reports on Form 8-K, but those reports are not 
relevant to this Article.  Current Reports on Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2007).  
“Current reports” refers to several events specified by the SEC as being significant 
enough to require the company to make public disclosure of the event prior to the time 
the next 10-Q quarterly report or 10-K annual report is due.  Events include the entry 
into or termination of a definitive material agreement, changes in control, business 
acquisitions, dispositions and combinations and failure to pay a required dividend, 
among many other events.  Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2007).  While it is conceiv-
able that a climate change event would be significant enough to trigger a Form 8-K 
filing, the system in place appears to be adequate for the task. 
 26. General Instruction C in Form 10-Q.  Form 10-Q, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2007) 
[hereinafter, Form 10-Q]; see also General Instruction C in Form 10-K.  Form 10-K, 17 
C.F.R. § 249.310 (2007) [hereinafter Form 10-K]. 
 27. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.915 (2007); Securities Act of 1933, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (2007). 
 28. Form 10-Q, supra note 26; Form 10-K, supra note 26. 
 29. Form 10-K, supra note 26, Item 1. 
 30. Form 10-Q, supra note 26; Form 10-K, supra note 26. 
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1.  Description of Business (Item 101) 
Item 101 requires the company to report information about the 
general development of the business during the past five years (or short-
er period if the company does not have a five year history).31  It requires 
a narrative description of the business, including a description of 
products and services, business practices, competitive conditions and 
more.32  Companies affected by climate change risk might use Item 101 
to disclose the risk to their business operations.  However, because the 
Item 101 description of business tends to be a broad-based discussion of 
operations – such as the products and services offered by the company – 
disclosure of climate change risk is more likely to appear in other sec-
tions of the periodic reports.  The business description might, nonethe-
less, include a description of new products and technologies being 
developed in association with climate change risk if management be-
lieves it is material to the description of the company’s business.  A des-
cription of the business is not required in the quarterly reports.33 
2.  Legal Proceedings (Item 103) 
Item 103 of Regulation S-K is designed for the company to disclose 
“any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine 
litigation incidental to the business.”34  However, the instructions to 
Item 103 state that an issuer need not provide information with respect 
to a litigation proceeding seeking damages if the damages would not 
exceed 10% of the consolidated assets of the company and its 
 
 31. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2008).  Smaller reporting companies 
need only describe the development of the business during the past three years.  Id. § 
229.101(h).  “Smaller reporting companies” are companies with public float of less than 
$75 million, or if they have no float at all, revenues less than $50 million.  Id. § 
229.10(f)(1) (2008).  Investment companies, asset-backed issuers and majority-owned 
subsidiaries of a non-small reporting company parent do not qualify as smaller 
reporting companies.  Id.  The “smaller reporting company” concept replaced the “small 
business issuer” concept, expanded the size of companies who fit the definition, and 
transferred the rules for these types of entities from Regulation S-B to the appropriate 
places in Regulation S-K.  Smaller Reporting Company Regulatory Relief and 
Simplification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8876, 92 SEC Docket 436 (Dec. 19, 
0  
). 
ulation S-K § 229.103. 
2 07).
 32. Regulation S-K § 229.101(c
 33. Form 10-Q, supra note 26. 
 34. Reg
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subsidiaries.35  Companies involved in climate change-related litigation 
must therefore disclose that litigation under Item 103 only if the 10% 
threshold is reached.  Thus, at present, climate change disclosure is 
likely to appear under Item 103 only if the company has run afoul of an 
environmental regulation that carries significant monetary penalties or 
civil liability.  Liability of this magnitude is relatively scarce and would 
likely grab headlines irrespective of the disclosure required by
3.  MD&A: Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Item 303) 
Item 303 of Regulation S-K is designed to allow management to 
disclose its own explanation for the financial condition and results of 
operations for the time period covered by the form.36  Although Item 
303 contains significant detail about what the issuer must disclose, such 
as trends and commitments related to the company’s liquidity and 
capital resources, the issuer also must provide all information it believes 
is “necessary to an understanding of its financial condition, changes in 
financial condition and results of operations,” even if the information is 
not specifically itemized in Item 303 of the regulation.37  Thus, manage-
ment might describe climate change risks under Item 303, particularly if 
they have a significant financial impact.  If, however, management has 
not yet evaluated the financial impact of climate change, there would be 
nothing to disclose in the MD&A regarding climate change risk. 
4.  Risk Factors (Item 503(c)) 
Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K requires the company to disclose the 
most significant factors that make ownership of the company’s securities 
risky.38  The risk factors are included in the company’s prospectus, 
which is delivered at the time the securities are first issued, and also 
appear in the annual reports on Form 10-K.39  In addition, Form 10-Q 
 35. Id. 
 36. Regulation S-K § 229.303(a).  For example, the time period covered by the first 
Form 10-Q a company files during a fiscal year is the most recently completed fiscal 
quarter.  The “MD&A” would analyze that quarter, and the comparative quarter from 
the previous fiscal year.  Regulation S-K § 229.303(b).  Smaller reporting companies 
have reduced requirements for the MD&A.  Regulation S-K § 229.303(d). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Regulation S-K § 229.503(c). 
 39. Id.; Form 10-K, supra note 26, at Item 1A.  Smaller reporting companies are 
not required to furnish risk factors in the annual report.  Id. at Item 1A. 
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requires quarterly reports to include any material changes in the risk 
factors that were reported in the last annual report.40 
Risk factors are taken seriously enough by the SEC that Item 503(c) 
explicitly requires a concise and logically organized presentation.41  The 
risk factors may not be hidden amongst the rest of the often lengthy and 
technical reports.42  Item 503(c) does not attempt to itemize the entire 
range of risks that may require disclosure, instead providing only a 
generic list of risks, including lack of operating history, lack of recent 
profitable operations, and lack of a market for the common stock of the 
company.43  Actual risk factor disclosure normally goes far beyond these 
generic categories.  Thus, details about climate change risks are a natural 
fit in the risk factors section of the periodic reports – assuming manage-
ment is aware of and knowledgeable about climate change risks.  At 
present, companies are not, in any widespread sense, using the 503(c) 
risk factors section to disclose climate change risks.44 
5.  Financial Statements 
Each annual report on Form 10-K must include audited financial 
statements of the company for the most recently completed fiscal year, 
with comparative information for prior years.45  Audited financial state-
ments include in the footnotes a section on contingent liabilities.46  The 
contingent liability rules apply when there is “an existing condition, situ-
ation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible . . . 
 40. Form 10-Q, supra note 26, at Item 1A.  Because smaller reporting companies 
are not required to furnish risk factors in the annual report, there is no requirement that 
their risk factors be updated on a quarterly basis.  Id. 
 41. Regulation S-K § 229.503(c). 
 42. Id. This is part of the SEC’s “Plain English” rule, which currently only applies 
to prospectuses, risk factor disclosures and some of the executive compensation dis-
closure in periodic reports.  See infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text. 
 43. Regulation S-K § 229.503(c). 
 44. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. 
 45. Form 10-K, supra note 26, at Item 8.  The method of preparation, content and 
form of the audited financial statements are governed by Regulation S-X under the 
Exchange Act.  Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (2007).  Form 10-Q also requires 
financial statements for the shorter period covered by the quarterly report, but they may 
be unaudited.  Form 10-Q, supra note 26, Item 1; Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §210.10-
01(a) (2007). 
 46. Financial Accounting Standards Board, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARDS NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES (Mar. 1975) [hereinafter 
FASB NO. 5], available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_FAS5.pdf. 
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loss . . . to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or 
more future events occur or fail to occur.”47 Examples include “[p]end-
ing or threatened litigation . . . [a]ctual or possible claims and assess-
ments . . . [and] [r]isk of loss from catastrophes assumed by property and 
casualty insurance companies including reinsurance companies.”48 
Disclosure of asserted claims is required if the loss is probable and 
can be reasonably estimated, or if there is at least a reasonable possibi-
lity that a loss may have occurred (regardless of whether it can be rea-
sonably estimated).49  Under the FASB rules, a loss is “probable” if it is 
“likely to occur.”50  A “reasonable possibility” of loss means the chance 
of the loss occurring is more than slight, but less than likely.51  If a claim 
is unasserted, disclosure is required only if the loss is probable and there 
is a reasonable possibility that the outcome will be negative.52 
It is possible for plaintiffs to assert claims associated with climate 
change risk and other environmental matters now, particularly if they 
relate to a violation of governmental laws or regulations.  In that event, 
such contingent liabilities must be disclosed if the potential negative 
financial consequences meet the FASB standards.  These requirements 
for the audited financial statements, however, cover much the same 
ground as the Item 103 disclosures relating to litigation, although the 
triggers for disclosure are stated differently.53  Still, this captures only a 
small piece of the climate change risk puzzle:  the portion that results in 
litigation with potential financial consequences exceeding the FASB 
thresholds.  Many contingent liabilities associated with climate change 
may be in the unasserted category at this stage of climate change 
science, meaning disclosure will only be triggered in the financial state-
 47. Id. at FAS5-2. 
 48. Id. at FAS5-3. 
 49. Id. at FAS5-4.  New rules in the mergers and acquisitions context require the 
participants to assign a market value to contingent liabilities, regardless of their like-
lihood or estimability.  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 141 (REVISED 2007):  BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, 8 (Dec. 
2007), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas141r.pdf.  There are different rules for 
contingencies that are non-contractual.  Id.  Those new rules do not apply in the context 
of periodic reporting in the quarterly and annual reports.  See id. 
 50. FASB NO. 5, supra note 46, at FAS5-2. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at FAS5-4. 
 53. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
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ments only if the loss is probable and there is a reasonable possibility 
that the outcome will be negative.54 
B. Materiality 
Even under these SEC rules and regulations, information must be 
disclosed in quarterly and annual reports only if it is material.55  The 
United States Supreme Court has formulated the materiality standard as 
information a reasonable investor would consider important in making 
an investment decision.56  With respect to future events, the probability 
of the event occurring must be evaluated in light of the magnitude of the 
event.57  Public corporations must consider this materiality standard in 
determining whether to disclose information about how climate change 
is affecting, or may affect, their businesses.  Judging from the issuers’ 
responses, many corporations do not consider climate change risk mate-
rial to their businesses, contrary to what investors are saying is important 
to them.58 
The SEC has at times viewed materiality primarily through an 
economic lens, leaving so-called “social disclosure” out of the process.59  
For example, in the early 1970s, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
proposed mandatory disclosure of environmental and civil rights mat-
ters.60  The SEC, however, decided that such matters were not material 
to investors, in part because they were not economically focused.61  
Clearly, the tide has shifted with respect to global warming and other 
environmental matters, which are no longer considered mere social 
issues.62  At the time of the NRDC petition, only a small segment of the 
investing public was interested in better environmental disclosure.63  
 
 54. FASB NO. 5, supra note 46, at FAS5-4. 
 55. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007) (describing Employment of Manipulative 
and Deceptive Devices). 
 56. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 237-40 (1988). 
 57. Id. at 238. 
 58. See infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text. 
 59. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate 
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1251 (1999). 
 60. Id. at 1246-73.  Professor Williams devotes an entire section of her article to 
the details of the SEC’s proceedings on the NRDC petition. 
 61. Id. at 1252-55. 
 62. Even in 1999, Professor Williams wrote that the same issues would be 
considered material today using the SEC’s standards two decades ago.  Id. 
 63. Id. at 1255-56. 
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Today, the Social Investment Forum suggests that socially responsible 
investing accounts for approximately 11% of the investment market, 
compared to a very small fraction cited at the time of the SEC’s deci-
sions on the NRDC petition.64 
Harvard Professor Cynthia Williams disagrees with the premise that 
materiality is primarily an economic consideration, both from the stand-
point of the legislative authority given to the SEC, and the SEC’s deter-
minations of materiality on other issues of corporate accountability.65  
Yet it certainly is arguable that climate change risk disclosure fits the 
materiality standard if evaluated solely by its economic effects.  Even 
without a direct economic tie-in, climate change risk disclosure also 
serves the purpose of “providing investors with full and fair information 
necessary to make informed investment decisions and to cast well-
informed votes to continue with the present management of a company, 
to pressure management to adopt new strategies, or to vote for new 
management.”66  Moreover, there is justification for taking into account 
the underlying moral issue when determining materiality to investors.67  
Corporations are given the status of legal persons by state law, and 
should have as much responsibility – arguably more – for the health of 
the planet and its inhabitants as any natural person. 
PART II.  CURRENT STATE OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISK DISCLOSURE 
A. Company Participation in Existing Disclosure Systems 
Researchers have decried the lack of meaningful public reporting 
on climate change risks.68  Several coalitions have engaged in efforts to 
 
 64. See Soc. Inv. Forum, Socially Responsible Investing Facts, available at 
http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/sriguide/srifacts.cfm (last visited Jan. 10, 2009); 
Williams, supra note 59, at 1251. 
 65. Williams, supra note 59, at 1263-68. 
 66. Id. at 1272. 
 67. Felix Frankfurter wrote “[t]he [Securities Act] embodies a wholly different 
conception of business morals.  It aims to make it difficult for corporate managers to 
evade responsibility.”  Id. at 1222-23 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities 
Act:  II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 110 (regulating business morals was a “major 
rationale” for the enactment of the Securities Act)).  Although this Article examines 
periodic reporting under the Exchange Act, disclosure is the hallmark of both the 
Securities Act and Exchange Act, and the determination of materiality is the same under 
both acts. 
 68. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of a General 
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improve climate change risk disclosure.  For example, the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an organization that seeks to elevate report-
ing on economic, environmental and social performance to the same 
level as financial disclosures.69 GRI has developed a set of 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines relating to economic, environ-
mental, human rights, labor, product responsibility and societal issues, 
supplemented by separate “indicator protocols” for each of thos
s.70 
The GRI reporting is designed to occur outside of the securities 
disclosure system.  In fact, U.S. companies have objected to the GRI 
guidelines as a tool for reporting to shareholders when shareholders have 
requested GRI-based reports through the proxy regulation system.71  
Yet, of those companies filing sustainability reports under the GRI 
guidelines, most are not reporting on environmental risk.  Instead, they 
focus on the positive opportunities arising from climate change issues.72  
According to a recent GRI report co-authored with KPMG’s Global 
Sustainability Services, “[environmental r]isks could be perceived to be 
beyond current business planning horizons, or companies may not have 
identified, explored or quantified risks associated with cli
may therefore not be in a position to report on risks.”73 
The aforementioned CERES coalition of investors, environmental 
groups and other public interest organizations concerns itself directly 
with securities disclosure on climate change.74 It commissions reports on 
Accounting Office Report on disclosure of environmental risks under the securities 
laws, see Perry E. Wallace, Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate 
Disclosure:  Are Things Heating Up In the Boardroom?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 319-
21 (2008). 
 69. Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/ (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 70. G3 Guidelines, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Guide 
lines/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 71. See, e.g., Texas Indus., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 2188373 (July 27, 
2007); ConAgra Foods, SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 1489570 (July 1, 2004), each 
arguing that the GRI guidelines are too vague and complex to serve as a basis for 
disclosure to shareholders. 
 72. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE & KPMG’S GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY 
SERVICES, REPORTING THE BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS 5 (2007), available at http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/ 
rdonlyres/C451A32E-A046-493B-9C62-7020325F1E54/0/ClimateChange_GRI_KPM 
G07.pdf.  The survey evaluated GRI sustainability reports from 2006.  Id. at 11. 
 73. Id. at 5. 
 74. CERES REPORT, supra note 1. 
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 provided approxi-
mate
ite could easily 
inco
r than half of the companies are 
publicly disclosing through the CDP.83 
the status of climate change disclosure, and also makes recommenda-
tions for improved disclosure.75  CERES reports that fewer than half of 
the companies in the S&P 500 responded to a questionnaire about cli-
mate change risks, opportunities and strategies, a much lower figure than 
the FT Global 500, a worldwide analog to the S&P 500.76  Among those 
companies that responded, nearly one-third refused to make their res-
ponses public.77  Overall, responding companies
ly 25% of the information investors are seeking.78 
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) also maintains a reporting 
system for climate change data, and its findings are no more encourag-
ing.79  The CDP, whose work in 2006 is relied upon in the CERES 
Report, is a non-profit organization designed to foster the relationship 
between investors and corporations on issues relating to climate 
change.80  Like GRI, the CDP system is external to the securities regu-
lation system, although presumably a company willing to publicly 
disclose its questionnaire responses on the CDP webs
rporate the same disclosures in its securities filings. 
According to the CDP, there are over 1,550 responding companies 
around the world.81  The 2007 results of the CDP questionnaire show 
64% of the companies in the S&P 500 Index respond to the question-
naire, but only 49% of the S&P 500 companies publish their disclosures 
on the CDP’s website.82  The results show an improved trend from the 
2006 data contained in the CERES Report with respect to companies’ 
willingness to respond and allow publication of the responses.  Never-
theless, the gains are small.  Still fewe
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at ii. 
 emitting companies to ignore the materiality of risks associ-
on Disclosure Project, www.cdproject.net (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
sure Project FAQs, http://www.cdproject.net/FAQs.asp (last 
 GLOBAL FT500 37, www.cdproject.net/download.asp?file=CDP5_FT500_Report. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 2.  Lower emitting companies were less likely to respond than high emit-
ting companies, such as those in the energy and automobile industries.  Id.  This likely 
reflects the inability of high
ated with climate change. 
 79. Carb
 80. Id. 
 81. Carbon Disclo
visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 82. See CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT REPORT 
2007,
pdf. 
 83. The CDP sent out its latest questionnaire in February 2008, with a May 31 
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The poor state of climate change disclosure was recently echoed 
more directly by investors.  In a 2007 petition to the SEC, a group of in-
vestors, environmental organizations and governmental constituencies 
pointed out variations in the quality of disclosure among SEC filings of 
members of the auto, insurance, energy, petrochemical and utilities in-
dustries from 2001-2006, calling it an “inconsistent patchwork of dis-
closure.”84 
B. Why Is Climate Change Disclosure So Scarce? 
Perhaps the growing number of reporting systems in the domestic 
and international communities contributes to the relatively poor partici-
pation in voluntary reporting schemes.  How should a company choose a 
system in which to participate?  Or, if a company is required to parti-
cipate in a state or federal reporting system, should it also participate in 
a broader voluntary system?  It may be that companies are willing to dis-
close, but the mechanics of disclosure are inconvenient. 
Yet, there also are intuitive, non-mechanical reasons for reluctance 
to disclose climate change risks.  First, the scope of the evaluation of cli-
mate change risk within an organization may be enormous, depending 
on the nature of the business.  Daniel Esty and Andrew Winston postu-
late that the evaluation of climate change risk involves more than the 
normal risk analysis, because it involves the upstream and downstream 
supply chain.85 
Second, a large investigative scope would normally associate with 
 
response deadline.  CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, http://www.cdproject.net/current-
questionnaire.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).  It already published the results in the 
September 2008 report.  CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT 
REPORT 2007, GLOBAL FT500, available at http://www.reeep.org/file_upload/9_tmpphp 
7Jeutc.pdf  (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 84. CLIMATE RISK PETITION, supra note 1, at 45-48. 
 85. Esty & Winston, supra note 13, at 116.  Those authors suggest what they call 
the “AUDIO” approach to evaluating a corporate environmental strategy.  AUDIO also 
is designed to identify issues and opportunities.  AUDIO is merely an acronym for the 
process of identifying the broad aspects of the environment that affect the business 
(e.g., water, energy), evaluating the value chain both upstream and downstream to 
identify the broad aspects affecting suppliers and customers, drilling down on what 
specific issues arise from those aspects and looking for opportunities to profit from 
them.  Id. at 60-61.  Climate change would be one “aspect” that would need to be evalu-
ated at the subject company, in the company’s supply chain, and at the customer level.  
See id. at 264. 
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all Street culture that judges companies on a quarterly earnings 
basis
 climate change disclosure is indica-
tive that disclosure is not yet ripe.89 
significant cost factors.  Research and development costs may be large at 
the outset, and may continue into the foreseeable future, particularly 
because the exact effects of climate change are still being studied – and 
will be for some time.86  While there are profit opportunities in the envi-
ronmental arena, they tend to have a long horizon, given the initial cost 
outlay.87  A long horizon of profitability does not fit well with the 
current W
.88 
Third, even those companies that have evaluated the risk may not 
fully appreciate its significance, or may have a distorted view of the risk.  
If the current corporate norm is averse to disclosing climate change risk, 
it may obscure the true nature of that risk.  Some managers may even 
believe the SEC’s relative silence on
 
 86. If the company puts in place systems to track environmental issues going 
forward – systems most companies do not currently have in place – the challenges may 
 not provide the 
 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/ 
9
be less daunting as time moves on.  Id. at 173-80. 
 87. Focusing on business opportunities is a traditional way to provide incentives 
for businesses to police themselves.  See, e.g., THE GREENING OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 
supra note 13.  Not every profitable exercise will be undertaken, however.  Businesses 
have finite resources, and if a climate change opportunity offers a smaller return than 
other, perhaps less environmentally-friendly alternatives, the climate change oppor-
tunity may not be pursued, despite its profitability.  In addition, companies seem to have 
less trouble identifying the opportunities than the risks, and that does
information investors seek.  See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Arthur Levitt, The Numbers Game, Remarks at NYU Center for Law and 
Business (Sept. 28,
1 98/spch220.txt. 
 89. A U.S. General Accounting Office Report in 2004 reported that the SEC’s 
Division of Corporation Finance took the position that GHG disclosures were not yet 
ripe because controls were not being adopted at the federal level, though the SEC 
acknowledged that there were circumstances in which they were required to be dis-
closed under materiality standards.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE:  SEC SHOULD EXPLORE 
WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 20-21 (2004), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04808.pdf.  The SEC has also been rela-
tively stingy with respect to shareholder proposals requesting companies to issue reports 
relating to climate change risks.  See, e.g., ACE Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 
846610 (Mar. 19, 2007) (permitting the company to exclude a shareholder proposal 
requesting a “report describing our company’s strategy and actions relative to climate 
change,” including public policy and legislation, the effect on the company and steps 
taken in response); Arch Coal, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 192477 (Jan. 17, 2008) 
(permitting the company to exclude a shareholder proposal requesting a “report . . . on 
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There is also evidence that managers do not make decisions that are 
ultimately rational.  The field of behavioralism seeks to explain the psy-
chology of decision making, including decisions made within an organi-
zational structure.90  To the extent a corporation is a reflection of its 
upper management, these behavioral factors may significantly influence 
a company’s decision about whether a particular issue is material and 
thus ripe for disclosure, or immaterial and exempt from disclosure 
requirements.91 
As Professor Susanna Kim Ripken writes: 
how the company is responding to rising regulatory, competitive, and public pressure to 
significantly reduce carbon dioxide emissions . . .”).  Under current shareholder 
proposal rules, the SEC walks a fine line in determining whether proposals relating to 
climate change reports intrude upon management’s province of “ordinary business 
matters” and require the company to “undertake an evaluation of risk.”  Shareholder 
Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2007).  The SEC’s approach to these issues has 
been deemed arbitrary and capricious, as they provide little information as the basis for 
their decisions.  A typical response in a SEC no-action letter reads like this:  “There 
appears to be some basis for your view that [Company Name] may exclude the proposal 
under rule 14a-8(i)(7), as relating to [Company Name’s] ordinary business operations 
(i.e., evaluation of risk).” See, e.g., Sunoco, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 384378 
(Feb. 8, 2008).  Professor Robert B. Ahdieh describes it like this:  “[T]he [SEC] 
Division [of Corporate Finance] seems to respond to no-action requests based on its gut 
assessment of the proposal under review and a pair of self-constructed heuristic devices, 
designed to offer at least the appearance of coherent analysis.”  Robert B. Ahdieh, The 
Dialectical Regulation of Rule 14a-8, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 165, 173 (2007) (citing 
Transcript of Roundtable Discussion Regarding Federal Proxy Rules & State 
Corporation Law (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy 
process/proxy-transcript050707.pdf). 
 90. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003) (addressing shareholder irrationality); Troy A. Paredes, Too 
Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate 
Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673 (2005) (addressing overconfidence of CEOs 
and generally cataloguing the most prominent behavioral economics scholarship).  See 
generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Symposium, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999); Russell Korobkin, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to 
Legal Scholarship:  Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Evolutionary Psychology, 
41 JURIMETRICS J. 319 (2001); Kent Greenfield, Symposium, Corporations Theory and 
Corporate Governance Law: Using Behavior Economics to Show the Power and 
Efficiency of Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002). 
 91. See Donald C. Hambrick & Phyllis A. Mason, Upper Echelons: The Organi-
zation as a Reflection of Its Top Managers, 9 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 193 (1984). 
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[T]he rationality of individuals’ decisions and actions is bounded 
because of inevitable limits on time, attention, skill and information. 
. . .  People have a tendency to use heuristics, i.e., mental shortcuts or 
rules of thumb, when making decisions about risks. . . .  These 
cognitive limitations come into play whenever a person must assess 
the probability of an uncertain event . . . .92 
It is this very “probability of an uncertain event” that managers 
must take into account when determining whether the risk is material for 
purposes of securities law disclosure.93 
Among these heuristics is “overconfidence bias” in which a mana-
ger may place too much confidence in his or her judgment about what 
the future holds.94  According to Professor Ripken, “[c]orporate execu-
tives may take on too many risks with the belief that adverse outcomes 
are unlikely to occur, or that they can be prevented from occurring by 
executives’ own skill and expertise.”95  Management’s miscalculation of 
the probability of a risk may result in no disclosure under the materiality 
standard. Alternatively, it may cause managers to distort the information 
disclosed, by focusing more on opportunities associated with climate 
change, and less on the real risks.96 
Of course, some members of upper management may not person-
ally agree with the scientific trend supporting human contributions to 
climate change.  The “anchoring” heuristic recognizes that managers 
may seek out information that only confirms their existing views.  They 
may not give enough credit to information that contradicts their existing 
views.97  Again, this could cause managers to place more emphasis on 
disclosing the opportunities associated with climate change, and less on 
the true risks.98  This greater focus on opportunities is borne out by the 
GRI findings.99 
 92. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: 
Toward A More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 
139, 157-59 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 93. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238-40 (1988); see supra notes 55-58 and 
accompanying text. 
 94. Ripken, supra note 92, at 163-66; Paredes, supra note 90, at 688-89. 
 95. Paredes, supra note 90, at 165. 
 96. Id. at 165-66. 
 97. Id. at 172-73. 
 98. See id. at 174-75. 
 99. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
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securities law disclosure. 
PART III.  EVALUAT NGE DISCLOSURE 
SYSTEMS AND PROPOSALS 
A. Disclosure Systems Outside the Securities Law Framework
It is easy to see that these biases could become more pronounced 
where the managers are incentivized to maximize short-term profits, 
because climate change risk evaluation and disclosure may threaten 
those incentives.100  Management may be reluctant to discover new 
problems, particularly those with a long horizon, costly resolution and, 
in some cases, the shame of public attention those problems might 
receive.  While this fear might seem antithetical to good business – after 
all, theoretically the best companies survive by discovering risks in 
advance and addressing them efficiently – the horizon for climate 
change risks may be generations long, and management will likely have 
little experience with such long time frames.  If the company discovers a 
host of problems with only costly long-term solutions, short-term 
investor reaction may be more harsh than if the company ignored the 
risks altogether.  In addition, the fact that some companies are willing to 
file sustainability reports with the Carbon Disclosure Project, but not 
make them publicly available or include them in securities filings, 
indicates that management fears the potential liability associated w
ING CURRENT CLIMATE CHA
 
These comprise an additional 38 pages.104  GRI has disclosed that 
The GRI is self-described as a “large multi-stakeholder network of 
thousands of experts” that “has pioneered the development of the 
world’s most widely used sustainability reporting framework.”101  As 
previously described, the GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines have 
an environmental component.102  The Sustainability Reporting Guide-
lines are 40 pages of general guidelines, followed by “indicator proto-
cols” for each of the subject areas (e.g., environmental, human rights, 
etc.).103  The environmental indicator protocols are further broken down 
into categories such as biodiversity, energy and emissions, and others.  
 
 100. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 101. Global Reporting Initiative, What We Do, http://www.globalreporting.org/ 
supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
AboutGRI/WhatWeDo/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 102. See 
 103. Id. 
 104. Global Reporting Initiative, Indicator Protocols Set: EN, Version 3.0, available 
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thousands of companies are issuing sustainability reports under the GRI 
Guidelines.105 
Although a significant number of public companies are using the 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, they seem to focus more on envi-
ronmental opportunities, and less on the risks associated with climate 
change.106  In addition, many companies have claimed the Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines are too vague and complex to be workable.107  The 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines have not found their way into 
periodic filings under the securities disclosure system with anything 
approaching regularity.  At this point in time, they are not a significant 
or convenient source of investor information about climate change risk. 
Similarly, the Carbon Disclosure Project operates externally to the 
securities regulation framework. As of July 2008, CDP reported that 385 
“signatory investors” are part of the CDP effort to get public companies 
to respond to the CDP questionnaire.108  The questionnaire asks for res-
ponses on risks and opportunities associated with climate change, cor-
porate strategies, corporate governance and accounting matters, among 
other things.109  While responses have been on the rise, still fewer than 
one-half of the companies in the S&P 500 agreed to have their responses 
publicly disclosed on the CDP’s Internet site, much less in securities 
filings.110  Moreover, like the other existing reporting systems, the dis-
closures on the Carbon Disclosure Project website are largely hidden 
from a general investing public that is unaware the Carbon Disclosure 
Project exists. 
at http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/F9BECDB8-95BE-4636-9F63-F8D91 
21900D4/0/G3_IP_Environment.pdf. 
 105. See Global Reporting Initiative, What We Do, supra note 101.  Not all of those 
companies are domestic.  Id. 
 106. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
 107. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  One can debate whether the GRI 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines are actually too vague and complex, or whether 
those are convenient arguments made by lawyers in the context of excluding share-
holder proposals from annual proxy statements.  If they are too vague or complex, the 
disclosure system is not going to be effective in informing consumers or investors.  See 
Ripken, supra note 92, at 157-59. 
 108. Carbon Disclosure Project, Signatory Investors, http://www.cdproject.net/ 
signatory-investors.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 109. Carbon Disclosure Project, Letter and Questionnaire: Greenhouse Gas (GHG) 
Emissions and Climate Change, Questionnaire 2-6 (Feb. 1, 2008), available at http:// 
www.cdproject.net/download.asp?file=CDP6_Letter_and_Questionnaire.pdf. 
 110. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
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GRI and the Carbon Disclosure Project have made significant 
inroads to obtaining greater corporate disclosure of risks relating to cli-
mate change by pressuring corporations to voluntarily report these risks 
through proprietary systems created by those entities.  Yet the level of 
participation remains unsatisfying, both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
In addition, their existence outside of traditional securities disclosure 
channels makes them of dubious value to most investors. 
GRI and the Carbon Disclosure Project are by no means the only 
existing avenues for voluntary disclosure of climate change data.  For 
example, the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection 
Agency each have a voluntary system for reporting GHG emissions.111  
Several states have implemented (or plan to implement) GHG registries, 
and in some cases the registries require mandatory disclosure of GHG 
emissions.112  Various international bodies have a mandatory registry as 
well, though their goals are not exclusively to promote disclosure.113 
In a recent symposium at the University of Virginia School of Law, 
Cornell law student Andrew Schatz argued for a scheme of mandatory 
disclosure of GHG emissions through the creation of a Greenhouse Gas 
Release Inventory (GGRI).114  This proposed GGRI would exist outside 
the securities regulation framework.115  Schatz identified five underlying 
principles of the GGRI proposal: “1) mandatory disclosure, 2) stan-
dardized information, 3) identification of companies, 4) reporting at 
regular intervals and 5) a primary purpose of reducing risks.”116 
 111. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENHANCING DOE’S VOLUNTARY 
REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GASES (1605(b)) PROGRAM, http://www.pi.energy.gov/ 
enhancingGHGregistry/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009); U.S. EPA, CLIMATE LEADERS, 
http://www.epa.gov/stateply/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 112. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CLIMATE CHANGE: ACTION 
BY STATES TO ADDRESS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 10-17 (Jan. 18, 2007), available 
at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80733.pdf. 
 113. See, e.g., European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/climat/emission/mrg_en.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2009); AUSTRALIAN 
GOV’T, DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE, AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL GREENHOUSE ACCOUNTS, 
http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/inventory/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 114. Andrew Schatz, Regulating Greenhouse Gases by Mandatory Information 
Disclosure, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 335 (2008). 
 115. Id. at 365-67. 
 116. Id. at 382 (citing MARY GRAHAM, HARVARD UNIV. INNOVATIONS IN AM. GOV’T 
PROGRAM, INFORMATION AS RISK REGULATION: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 5 (May 
2001), available at http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/cache/documents/0/74.pdf. 
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Schatz’s proposed GGRI is an interesting idea, particularly because 
it incorporates the elements of an effective disclosure system.117  
However, because the GGRI is not part of the periodic reporting system 
required by the securities laws, it would not be a sufficient means of get-
ting information to securities investors.  By Schatz’s own admission, in-
vestors may not have the time and energy to find the GGRI informa-
tion.118 Moreover, the GGRI would rely on The Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol adopted by the World Resources Institute, a data-based report-
ing system calling for reporting of “scope 1 and scope 2 emissions,” 
“emissions data for all six GHG’s separately (CO2, CH4, N20, HFCs, 
PFCs, SF6)” and “direct CO2 emissions from biologically sequestered 
carbon,” among other things.119  This information would be appropriate-
ly standardized, but even if an investor could find the GGRI, the level 
and kind of raw detail in a GGRI is still unlikely to be understood by 
even the most sophisticated investor. The GGRI is geared towards tech-
nical information to accomplish risk reduction.120  Investors need a ver-
sion of the risks posed by GHG emissions that they can understand. 
The sheer number of registries and reporting systems presents an 
inefficient solution for investors, particularly when considering the kind 
of technical data that these reporting systems require.  If companies were 
more willing to make disclosures, and investors were able to find them, 
there are still too many reporting systems for companies to use all of 
them.  Such fractured reporting would only confuse investors, even if 
they were able to find the different reports and interpret them accurately. 
B. CERES Requests for Improved Securities Disclosure 
The CERES report in March 2007 (the “CERES Report”) encour-
aged companies to “elevate climate change as a corporate priority and 
communicate openly with investors about their strategies and res-
ponses.”121  The CERES Report contains specific recommendations for 
climate change reporting under the securities laws, relying heavily on 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Schatz, supra note 114, at 391-92.  To be clear, Schatz’s goal for the GGRI was 
not based on getting information to investors. 
 119. THE GREENHOUSE PROTOCOL INITIATIVE, A CORPORATE ACCOUNTING AND 
REPORTING STANDARD 63 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ 
downloads/Publications/ghg-protocol-revised.pdf. 
 120. Schatz, supra note 114, at 382. 
 121. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at ii. 
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the Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure.122  The Global 
Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure was developed by fourteen 
institutional investors in October 2006 to standardize climate risk 
disclosure.123  Specifically, the four elements of disclosure are: (1) dis-
closing historical, current and projected greenhouse gas emissions; (2) 
analyzing climate risk and emissions management; (3) assessing physi-
cal risks; and (4) analyzing regulatory risks relating to greenhouse 
gases.124 
The CERES recommendations are well thought out and clear, but 
they do not represent the first requests from investors for more climate 
change risk disclosure.  Requests have been coming from institutional 
investors for twenty years.125  These repeated requests have resulted in 
more disclosure in periodic securities filings, but progress has been 
slow, as indicated by responses to recent surveys that still show invest-
tors receiving approximately 25% of the information they want.126  
While the CERES recommendations are laudable, they have not gained 
sufficient traction in their present form.  They are effecting change too 
slowly, given the enormity and complexity of the global warming 
problem and the apparent corporate resistance to voluntary disclosure.  
Part IV of this Article proposes paring back some of the CERES guide-
lines to better fit the securities regulation scheme, and suggests the SEC 
should use these slimmer guidelines as a means of implementing manda-
tory disclosure of climate change risks. 
C. Climate Risk Petition to SEC 
A collection of institutional investors, governmental officers, attor-
neys general, environmental organizations and non-profit groups is 
addressing the disclosure issue more directly under the securities law 
framework.  In the aforementioned Climate Risk Petition, these groups 
are asking the SEC to issue interpretive guidance for reporting climate 
change issues under existing mandatory disclosure rules and regulations, 
including Items 101, 103 and 303 of Regulation S-K.127  The petition 
 
 122. Id. at 3. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  This Article will return to these four elements when formulating a frame-
work for mandatory disclosure under the securities laws. 
 125. White, supra note 15, at 32, 47-50. 
 126. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
 127. CLIMATE RISK PETITION, supra note 1, at 15-18.  The Climate Risk Petition 
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also discusses financial disclosures of climate change risks under FASB 
No. 5.128  Specifically, the petition requests prompt “clarification” from 
the SEC that registrants must review relevant information about climate 
change risks and disclose material information associated with climate 
change physical risks and legal proceedings, as well as financial risks 
and opportunities associated with CO2 emissions.129 
The core concept underlying the Climate Risk Petition is that 
climate change is now material for many, if not most, companies.130  
The Climate Risk Petition asserts that climate change risks are important 
to investors, as indicated by the calls for change coming from investor 
groups.131  The petition suggests that it will be enough if the SEC clearly 
relies on a Friends of the Earth report descriptively entitled Fifth Survey of Climate 
Change Disclosure in SEC Filings of Automobile, Insurance, Oil & Gas, 
Petrochemical, and Utilities Companies, issued in October 2006.  Id.; MICHELLE CHAN-
FISHEL, FRIENDS OF EARTH – US, FIFTH SURVEY OF CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE IN 
SEC FILINGS OF AUTOMOBILE, INSURANCE, OIL & GAS, PETROCHEMICAL, AND UTILITIES 
COMPANIES (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/SECFinalReport 
andAppendices.pdf.  In October 2007, the Free Enterprise Action Fund (FEAF) also 
petitioned the SEC to require companies to disclose risks associated with global warm-
ing regulations, but with a different underlying purpose. The FEAF proposal seeks 
disclosure about regulatory risk as a means of exposing the high cost of regulation, with 
a view to curtailing additional global warming regulation.  Press Release, Free 
Enterprise Action Fund, SEC Petitioned to Require Companies to Disclose Risk of 
Global Warming Regulation; Free Enterprise Action Fund (Ticker: FEAOX) Says 
Companies Risk Earnings While Keeping Shareholders in the Dark (Oct. 30, 2007), 
http://www.freeenterpriseactionfund.com/release103007.  FEAF considers social res-
ponsibility to be “anti-business.”  Free Enterprise Action Fund, Advocacy, http://www. 
freeenterpriseactionfund.com/advocacy.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).  FEAF is also 
involved in the shareholder proposal process.  FEAF has identified companies with sta-
ted climate change policies that have supported global warming regulation, and asked 
those companies to disclose the cost of the regulatory uncertainty.  See, e.g., General 
Electric, SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 329028 (Jan. 31, 2007); PepsiCo, SEC No-
Action Letter, 2008 WL 555650 (Feb. 28, 2008).  Many of the FEAF shareholder 
proposals refer to global warming as “junk science.”  See, e.g., General Electric, SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 329028, at *8 (Jan. 31, 2007) (“Is junk science-based 
global warming regulation what the world needs?”). 
 128. CLIMATE RISK PETITION, supra note 1, at 15. 
 129. Id. at 53, 56. 
 130. See id. at 13-14. 
 131. The petition contains a list of advisory services, investment research firms, 
market indices and mutual funds relating to climate change issues.  Id. at 35-38.  It also 
cites some of the investor initiatives described in the text accompanying notes 101-26, 
such as GRI and the Carbon Disclosure Project.  Id. at 39-40. 
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affirms that registrants must give “close and well informed attention” to 
climate change risks and disclose material effects of climate change and 
greenhouse gas emissions on their operations and financial condition.132  
Thus, the petition primarily asks the SEC to declare climate change risks 
important enough for companies to evaluate.133  It then relies on existing 
securities laws to mandate disclosure if the companies find material 
information in that evaluation.134 
The Climate Risk Petition recognizes that the securities regulatory 
scheme already has in place a mandatory disclosure system based on 
rules in Regulation S-K and the concept of materiality.135  However, the 
current disclosure system is not tailored to global warming risks, and the 
SEC has been unclear about its policies relating to climate risk dis-
closure under the securities laws.136  This explains the petition’s request 
for “clarification” from the SEC regarding climate change disclosure 
under the securities disclosure system, as well as its plea for the SEC to 
act promptly. 
Yet the Climate Risk Petition is unclear about what it really wants.  
In several places, it mentions broad categories of disclosure, including: 
(1) physical risks, (2) financial risks and opportunities associated with 
greenhouse gas regulation, and (3) legal proceedings.137  It also requests 
that the SEC “set forth the elements of disclosure appropriate for those 
companies that determine that climate risk has a material impact on their 
performance and operations.”138  The Climate Risk Petition does not, 
however, guide the SEC with respect to what the “elements of dis-
closure” are, beyond having mentioned the importance of physical, fi-
nancial and legal risks and opportunities. 
In fact, the Climate Risk Petition seems to be afraid to ask for too 
much.  Its introduction calls for “a statement from the Commission that 
companies must consider climate risk in their review of information that 
may be material and subject to disclosure” and states that “the Com-
 132. Id. at 56. 
 133. Id. at 9, 14. 
 134. See id. at 15-20. 
 135. See supra Part I. 
 136. See Wallace, supra note 68, at 319-21; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD 
EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 16-17 
(July 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04808.pdf. 
 137. CLIMATE RISK PETITION, supra note 1, at 53. 
 138. Id. at 52. 
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mission should clarify that, under existing law, registrants must disclose 
any and all material information related to climate change.”139  While 
the petition asserts that the physical, financial and legal risks relating to 
climate change “may be . . . subject to disclosure,” it fails to suggest the 
SEC make those elements part of the clarification.140  Finally, in the 
closing paragraph, the petition requests “simply . . . a clear affirmation 
that . . . registrants must give close and well informed attention to poten-
tial climate change risks that may affect them and . . . consistent with 
established law, disclose material information relating to the impacts of 
climate change and greenhouse gas regulation . . . .”141 
Although the Climate Risk Petition mentions broad categories of 
disclosure, the introduction and final paragraphs appear to seek nothing 
more than a declaration from the SEC that companies should do what 
the securities laws already require them to do.  Accordingly, reporting 
companies may view any such SEC guidance or “clarification” neutral-
ly, because it only rehashes the companies’ already-existing duties under 
the securities laws.  Perhaps there would be an uptick in the number of 
corporations that investigate climate change matters, simply because the 
issuance of guidance would mean the SEC is showing an interest.  
Nevertheless, the decision about which matters to investigate and which 
matters are material would remain with the same managers making those 
decisions today under the same securities laws in effect today, clouded 
by the same heuristics.142  So far, that has not been a successful means of 
achieving effective climate change risk disclosure. 
D. An Analogy to “Y2K”: Is SEC Rulemaking on Climate Change  
Risk Disclosure Appropriate? 
The Climate Risk Petition is the most recent and most direct 
attempt to improve climate change risk disclosure in securities law 
filings.  Its approach is to seek guidance from the SEC regarding comp-
liance with existing securities laws.  That prompts the question:  Should 
the SEC’s framework for disclosure of material climate change risks be 
stated through guidance regarding the applicability of existing laws and 
rules, or through the more formal rulemaking process? 
 
 139. Id. at 9. 
 140. Id. (emphasis added). 
 141. Id. at 56. 
 142. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text. 
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The climate change risk disclosure issue finds some similarities to 
the “Year 2000” disclosure issue faced by public companies in the late 
1990s.  Like climate change risk disclosure, many public companies 
were already addressing the Year 2000 problem in their disclosures.143  
The SEC noted, “[w]hile the number of companies disclosing Year 2000 
issues has increased dramatically, the task force surveys show that many 
companies are not providing the quality of disclosure that we believe 
investors expect.”144  Like climate change issues, the solutions to the 
Year 2000 problem were not entirely clear at the time the SEC decided 
to act, but time was of the essence. 
In the Year 2000 situation, the SEC chose the guidance approach to 
assist public companies with their Year 2000 disclosures.145  There were 
several reasons for this approach.  The process for issuing SEC guidance 
is much more nimble – and arguably more suited to a moving and 
evolving target – than rulemaking.  Rulemaking often begins with a 
“concept release” that outlines the broad issues to be addressed and 
seeks public responses to a series of questions.146  If, after receiving the 
public responses, the SEC decides to continue the rulemaking process, it 
issues a “proposed rule,” which is essentially a good draft of the rule 
accompanied by the SEC’s explanation of the reasoning behind the 
provisions.147  The time period between a concept release and proposed 
rule varies, but as with legislation, drafting a formal rule takes time and 
study.  The proposed rule is then made available for comment by mem-
bers of the public for a short time period, usually between 30-60 days,148 
although for high profile or complex rules the time period may be 
 143. Interpretation: Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences by Public 
Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Companies, and Municipal Securities 
Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 33-7558 (July 29, 1998), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/rules/interp/33-7558.htm [hereinafter SEC Year 2000 Release]. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See SEC, SEC Concept Releases, http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept.shtml (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 147. See SEC, SEC Proposed Rules, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
 148. See, e.g., Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-57967 (June 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/34-57967.pdf (allowing 39 days for public 
comment); see also SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, 
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov 
/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
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longer.149  After the comment period, the SEC studies the responses and, 
if warranted, formulates a final rule.150 
The SEC issued guidance for the Year 2000 problem in part be-
cause it did not have time to wait for the rulemaking process to be com-
pleted, particularly in light of the fact that the release was adopted only 
17 months before the calendar turned to 2000.151  In addition, it could 
have more easily updated its guidance with subsequent releases, as the 
problems associated with the Year 2000 became more evident.  In other 
words, guidance allowed the SEC to react to the Year 2000 problem “on 
the fly,” or at least as close to that concept as a large government agency 
is able to get.  Similarly, SEC guidance would allow a quick response to 
the climate change disclosure problem, but would also permit the flexi-
bility to update the response as climate change effects and solutions 
evolve. 
Also, like climate change disclosure, the Year 2000 problem was 
not a problem for many public companies, and even those companies 
affected by the Year 2000 issue were affected in different ways.  The 
SEC made clear that its statement regarding disclosure of the Year 2000 
problem was not a declaration that every company had a Year 2000 
problem, even though every company probably owned a computer.152  
 149. See, e.g., Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-56161 (July 27, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/2007/34-56161.pdf (allowing 67 days for public comment on the high-
profile issue regarding proxy proposals and election of directors); Modernization of the 
Oil and Gas Reporting Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 33-8935 (June 26, 
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/33-8935.pdf (allowing 74 
days for public comment on a rule involving complex and controversial methods of 
calculation). 
 150. An illustration may be helpful.  In December 2007, the SEC issued a concept 
release regarding changes to disclosure requirements relating to oil and gas reserves.  
Concept Release on Possible Revisions to the Disclosure Requirements Relating to Oil 
and Gas Reserves, Securities Act Release No. 33-8870 (Dec. 12, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2007/33-8870.pdf.  The SEC allowed approximately 
two months for comment.  Id. at 1.  In June 2008, the SEC published its proposed rule 
on the issue, and allowed until September 2008 for public comment on the proposed 
rule.  Modernization of the Oil and Gas Reporting Requirements, Exchange Act Release 
No. 33-8935 (June 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/33-
8935.pdf.  The comment period expired September 8, 2008.  With a September 
comment date and a complex rule, it seems unlikely that the final rule will appear 
within 12 months of the concept release. 
 151. SEC Year 2000 Release, supra note 143. 
 152. See Interpretation: FAQ About the Statement of the Commission Regarding 
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The SEC wrote that “[m]erely because a matter was addressed in the 
Release does not mean it applies to every company.”153  Similarly, not 
every company is affected by climate change risk to the same degree.  
Arguably, the less pervasive the subject matter, the less likely it is a 
candidate for the more formal rulemaking process. 
Yet there is something unsettling about mere “guidance” on climate 
change risk disclosure.  Climate change risk has a permanence that the 
Year 2000 computer glitch did not.  The consequences are presumably 
greater as well.  Guidance serves as no more than an interpretation of 
existing law, without carrying the force of law.  Given the perhaps in-
finite time horizon and consequences associated with climate change 
issues, guidance has the appearance of a weak response, particularly if it 
consists of a mere SEC pronouncement that companies should adhere to 
the strictures of current disclosure regulations, which seems to be the 
crux of the Climate Risk Petition.154 
Importantly, the SEC rulemaking process carries the force of law 
and has a permanence that mere guidance does not.  It is that force and 
permanence that provides the greatest impact on improving climate 
change risk disclosure.  Unlike the Year 2000 problem, there is no defin-
able end date for climate change; that, too, seems to warrant a more 
permanent and formal pronouncement.  Although there is a sense of ur-
gency about climate change risks, there is no hard and fast date (like 
December 31, 1999) by which the task must be accomplished.  There is 
time for rulemaking on climate change risk disclosure. 
Of course, the science of climate change is a moving target.  The 
rules might need to evolve over time.  The rules may be amended, which 
would entail the rulemaking process again and might not be nimble 
enough to keep up with the changes.  But the SEC would still have, after 
adopting formal rules, the flexibility to issue guidance with respect to 
those rules, thus attacking the problem with the best features of both 
rulemaking and guidance. 
Moreover, climate change risk disclosure is an area that could 
benefit from public comment.  While the particular details of each Year 
2000 problem were still being analyzed in 1998, the general effect of the 
problem (computer shutdowns) and the broad solution (fix the dates in 
Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences by Public Companies, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-7609 (Nov. 9, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-
7609.htm. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See supra notes 127-41 and accompanying text. 
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the computer) were apparent.  Public comment from investors would 
likely have added little substance to the SEC’s pronouncement and 
would have only delayed the process.  In contrast, in many cases even 
broad solutions to climate change risk are still in development, and the 
number of ways industries and companies are affected by and affect 
climate change remains to be discovered.  Public input from various 
stakeholders would inform the rules. 
If the SEC takes the rulemaking path, it will need to provide a list 
of specific climate change disclosures, like those requested of companies 
in the CERES report.155  An overly broad list would potentially capture 
too many issues, trapping some companies in its net with respect to 
issues that are irrelevant to them.  Conversely, a narrow list would cap-
ture too few.  The SEC is not inexperienced in this regard, however.  
Regulation S-K is replete with lists that apply to some, but not all 
companies.156  And, the same concerns arose in the SEC’s release for the 
Year 2000 problem.157 
The next section of this Article recommends a list of mandatory cli-
mate change disclosures that would be appropriate for inclusion in either 
SEC guidance or rulemaking, in the hope of balancing the investor’s 
need for information and the company’s ability to comply. 
PART IV.  PROPOSED ELEMENTS OF MANDATORY CLIMATE CHANGE 
DISCLOSURE IN SECURITIES FILINGS 
Unlike the Climate Risk Petition, the CERES report contains de-
tailed information about what investors want with respect to climate 
change disclosure.158  The more detailed guidelines likely stem from the 
CERES report’s call for voluntary disclosure, whereas the Climate Risk 
 155. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. 
 156. See generally Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.915 (2007). 
 157. See SEC Year 2000 Release, supra note 143.  The categories of information for 
Year 2000 disclosure were “(1) the company’s state of readiness; (2) the costs to 
address the Company’s Year 2000 issues; (3) the risks of the company’s Year 2000 
issues; and (4) the company’s contingency plans.”  Id.  But, the same broad-based list 
would not be feasible for climate change disclosure.  Unlike the Year 2000 problem, the 
boundaries of which were fixed, the climate change problem is comprehensive, multi-
faceted, and to some degree, still undocumented. A list like the Year 2000 disclosure 
list – or even the categories suggested by the Climate Risk Petition – would be far too 
broad to balance investors’ need for information and the company’s ability to 
reasonably comply. 
 158. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at §§ 3.1.a, 3.2.a, 3.3.a, 3.4.a. 
2009 WARMING UP TO CLIMATE CHANGE 311 
RISK DISCLOSURE 
 
Petition asks the SEC directly for guidance on compliance with manda-
tory disclosure items.  The CERES guidelines form a suitable starting 
point for creating mandatory disclosure of climate change risks, whether 
through SEC rulemaking or guidance.159 
Because the CERES report seeks voluntary disclosure, however, it 
requests some information that would not be proper for mandatory 
disclosure under the securities laws.  For one, the CERES requests in-
clude items that are generally inconsistent with other aspects of the 
securities regulation scheme, as detailed further below.  Moreover, some 
of the requested information runs the risk of being overly complex or too 
voluminous.  In fact, too much disclosure and overly-complex disclosure 
actually hinder good decision making by investors.160  The “raw” re-
porting systems of GRI, the Carbon Disclosure Project, and the proposed 
Greenhouse Gas Release Inventory suffer significantly from this prob-
lem; the CERES recommendations less so.  Nevertheless, an effective 
disclosure system needs to be reasonably concise. 
This Part sets forth the specific CERES report requests and pares 
them down to disclosure items suitable for mandatory disclosure rules or 
guidance from the SEC.  The CERES categories are: 
 
• Category 1: Strategic analysis of climate risk and 
emissions management; 
• Category 2: GGH emissions disclosure; 
 159. Reliance on CERES as a framework for securities disclosure is not a new idea. 
In 1999, Professor Williams suggested that the CERES principles were a “possible 
prototype” for social disclosure in securities law filings.  Williams, supra note 59, at 
1202, n.12.  At that time, CERES was in the process of standardizing its reporting 
guidelines.  Id.  The CERES guidelines at the time asked companies to report on regula-
tory schemes in the areas of air and water quality, wildlife and habitat protection, and 
chemical and radioactive material regulation, among other things.  Id. at n.506.  It also 
sought information on products, a company’s supply chain, emissions, workplace health 
and safety, and several other topics.  Id. at n.507.  The CERES report format at the time 
was not focused on climate change risks, but rather, the broader spectrum of environ-
mental risks.  Id.  One of the benefits Professor Williams saw in the CERES guidelines 
was the fact that the format was somewhat standardized, allowing for cross-company 
comparisons.  Id.  Ten years have passed since the CERES report cited in Professor 
Williams’s article.  In that time, CERES has added significant focus on climate change 
recommendations, which serve as the starting point for the proposed mandatory 
disclosure system advocated in this article. 
 160. Ripken, supra note 92, at 146-47 (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 
U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976)). 
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• Category 3: Physical risks; and 
• Category 4: Regulatory risks.161 
 
The recommendations below better reflect the detail investors want 
in those categories – as compared to the Climate Risk Petition request – 
but do not overreach into areas that would be problematic for mandatory 
disclosure or inconsistent with the existing securities disclosure scheme.  
The recommendations also focus on simplifying the information in 
hopes of making the information more useful to investors. 
A. Category 1: Strategic Analysis of Climate Risk  
and Emissions Management 
The CERES report requests three categories of disclosure relating 
to the strategic analysis of climate risk and emissions management: (1) a 
climate change policy statement, (2) a corporate statement of its risk 
mitigation efforts, and (3) a description of corporate governance matters 
related to climate change risks.162  What investors seek is an analysis of 
the challenges and opportunities faced by the company, including how it 
affects the company’s ability to compete in the marketplace.163 
1.  Climate Change Policy Statement 
CERES requests a climate change policy statement reflecting “the 
company’s current position on climate change, its responsibility to 
address climate change, and its engagement with governments and 
advocacy organizations to affect climate change policy.”164 
 
The CERES-recommended climate change policy statement should 
be mandatory for all companies in their annual reports.165  Although the 
full scope of climate change remains unknown (and will remain that way 
for some time), one would be hard-pressed to identify a company that 
did not face one or more potential risks, given what scientists currently 
know about the effects of climate change.  For that reason, the climate 
 
 161. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. 
 162. Id. at 15-16. 
 163. Id. at 15. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Presumably, an annual statement of policy would be sufficient because policy 
changes do not normally take place with a frequency warranting quarterly disclosure. 
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change policy statement should not be tied to a materiality standard, but 
rather, should be a required statement for every company. 
Companies with a climate change policy should have no difficulty 
including that policy in annual reports to the SEC.  Those without one 
should be required to either develop a policy or reveal to investors that 
they have not adopted one.  In that regard, the mandatory disclosure rule 
or guidance could provide companies with opt-out language.  In lieu of 
describing its climate change policy, a company could be permitted to 
include a statement that the company does not have a climate change 
policy as of the time of the periodic filing, followed by an optional brief 
explanation of why no climate change policy is in place. 
Investors would gain a better understanding of the company’s 
position on climate change from a policy standpoint.  It should be rela-
tively easy for investors to determine whether the company has a serious 
commitment to addressing climate change risks, or whether the company 
is lagging behind the market in that regard.  For companies with weak 
policies – or without a climate change policy at all – investors would be 
able to exert pressure on the company to adopt a meaningful policy or 
simply choose not to invest in that company. 
2.  Emissions Management 
CERES requests an explanation of the company’s emissions 
management activities, to elucidate what the company is doing to 
minimize its own risks associated with climate change, as well as 
identifying potential opportunities.166  Specifically, the CERES report 
requests information about how the company is addressing green-
house gas emissions, including reduction targets, development of new 
technologies and products and prospective timelines.167 
 
Every company should be required to disclose in its annual report 
significant actions the company is taking to minimize its risks from the 
effects of climate change, and to identify opportunities.  There is some 
evidence that companies are already identifying opportunities, but many 
are not identifying the risks and describing steps to minimize those 
risks.168  Periodic reporting of efforts to reduce or offset greenhouse gas 
 166. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. 
 167. Id. at 15-16. 
 168. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
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emissions, as well as establishing reduction targets and timelines and in-
vesting in new technologies and products, must be part of this disclosure 
process. 
Unlike the climate change policy statement, the disclosure of the 
company’s actions to minimize climate risk and to avail itself of 
opportunities should be subject to the materiality standard.169  The com-
pany that discloses no actions to minimize climate risk should be 
required to include a statement in its periodic filings that “there are no 
material risks to the company associated with climate change.” 
In effect, this does what the Climate Risk Petition seeks: it 
acknowledges climate change risk as worthy of investigation, and po-
tentially material.  This would eliminate the idea that climate change 
risk, given the long time horizon and confusing science, is not material 
enough for companies to investigate.  It also would ensure investors that 
the company has not simply forgotten about the issue.  Companies that 
believe there are no material risks from climate change would be re-
quired to say so explicitly, to inform investors that the risks have actual-
ly been considered.  At the same time, management would not be forced 
to disclose risks that are investigated and determined to be nonexistent 
or immaterial. 
3. Corporate Governance and Climate Change 
CERES requests a description of corporate governance actions 
relating to climate change, including the names of executives who 
have oversight of climate risk, whether the board is involved in the cli-
mate change decision making process and whether executive com-
pensation is linked with meeting climate risk objectives.170 
 
Every company should be required to include a statement in its 
annual report regarding the board’s and management’s involvement in 
addressing climate change risk.  A simple statement regarding the fre-
quency with which the board is updated on climate change policies and 
 169. The CERES report uses the word “significant,” but introducing a new standard 
would be problematic.  See CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at § 3.1.a (stating that 
investors urge companies to disclose a strategic analysis that includes an explanation of 
all significant actions the company is taking to minimize its climate risks).  The concept 
of materiality likely captures all actions that would be considered significant, and would 
fit within the existing securities law framework. 
 170. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. 
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actions, and the titles of executives in charge of addressing climate 
change risk, should suffice.  For the same reasons advocated with re-
spect to the climate change policy statement, there is no need to subject 
this item to a materiality standard.  Even companies that ultimately 
determine they do not have any material climate change risks must have 
investigated the issue and assigned a management team to the evalu-
ation.  Disclosing that the board and management are involved should be 
painless for reporting companies. 
Meanwhile, investors could take comfort in knowing that the 
company has gone beyond mere policy statements and has engaged the 
board and management in the process of implementing the policy.  
Although the CERES report suggests identifying the executives by 
name, it seems sufficient to identify them by title.  The names of some 
of the executives in charge of climate change risk may not already be 
disclosed under other SEC rules and regulations, because some of the 
positions may not be at the highest levels of the organization.  Intro-
ducing new names in the periodic filings may create privacy and liability 
issues for some of the individuals involved, without providing investors 
with a sufficient benefit to outweigh the potential harm to the individual 
members of management.  The executives’ titles alone would be suffi-
cient for investors to know that the company has engaged members of 
management in the climate change risk process. 
The CERES report also states, “companies should disclose whether 
executive compensation is tied to meeting corporate climate objectives, 
and if so, a description of how they are linked.”171  This constitutes an 
example of a CERES recommendation that ought to remain voluntary.  
As discussed above, there are privacy and liability concerns associated 
with revealing the names of executives who are not already named in 
periodic filings.  Revealing their compensation incentives would exacer-
bate that problem. In addition, recent executive compensation disclosure 
reforms have been controversial.172  Requiring additional compensation 
disclosure relating to climate change risk would only fan the flames. 
 171. Id. at 16. 
 172. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Excessive Executive Compensation – 
Why Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 277 (2007); see also Executive Compensation and 
Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-8732A (Nov. 7, 2006), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf.  The SEC received over 
20,000 comments on its proposed executive compensation rule.  SEC, COMMENTS ON 
PROPOSED RULE: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURE, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). 
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B. Category 2: GGH Emissions Disclosure 
Regarding GGH emissions, CERES urges, that “companies should 
disclose their total greenhouse gas emissions.  Investors can use this 
emissions data to help approximate the risk companies may face from 
future climate change regulations.”173 
 
Specifically, CERES requests historical emissions data since 
1990, current emissions data and estimated future emissions from 
operations, including those associated with the supply chain.  The 
report recommends using the Corporate Accounting and Reporting 
Standard of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol.174 
 
There are several problems with including the CERES recom-
mendation, as written, as an element of mandatory disclosure through 
rulemaking or guidance.  First, it requests what amounts to a “data 
dump” of greenhouse gas emissions.  While some investors have the 
wherewithal to interpret the emissions data, the vast majority of 
investors will be no more informed than they would be in the absence of 
the data.  The Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard of the 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol referenced in the report is the same standard 
recommended by Andrew Schatz for his proposed Greenhouse Gas 
Release Inventory, and suffers from the same deficiencies.175  In other 
words, most investors will not be able to approximate climate change 
risk from the data simply because most investors are not qualified to do 
so.  Nor will investors be able to compare the emissions data provided 
by one company with the emissions data provided by another.176 
Second, requiring data from as far back as 1990 is inconsistent with 
the historical data required by SEC rules in every other context.  For 
example, companies report five years’ worth of historical data in their 
annual report filings on Form 10-K177 and the description of the business 
 
 173. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 20. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. 
 176. Investors would be able determine who has greater emissions, of course, but 
without the proper context.  Bigger companies and companies in certain industries 
(trucking companies, for instance) might have bigger emission numbers than smaller 
companies or companies in other industries (financial services, for instance), but those 
bigger numbers may not be indicative of poor climate change policies and procedures. 
 177. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.301(a) (2007).  Smaller reporting companies 
need not provide the financial disclosures required by Item 301(a).  Id. § 229.301(c). 
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experience of the management team similarly looks back only five 
years.178  To the extent greenhouse gas emission data is required, it 
should not consist of data covering nearly 20 years.  Rather, the histori-
cal reporting should go back only as far as necessary to allow investors 
to see trends.  Five years of data should be sufficient for that purpose, 
although public comment on a proposed rule may suggest extending the 
period to seven or even ten years. 
Third, requiring projected emissions for the future is contrary to the 
current reporting scheme under SEC rules with respect to other topics.  
Companies are not required to include forecasts or projections in their 
periodic reports.179  When they do so voluntarily, they are able to use 
statutory safe harbors for “forward looking statements.”180  Accordingly, 
the projected future emissions component of the CERES recommenda-
tion should be left to voluntary disclosure. 
A better approach from the standpoint of mandatory disclosure is to 
blend meaningful current and historical greenhouse gas emissions data 
with the description of the actions management is taking to minimize 
climate risk, as described in the recommendations for strategic analysis 
of climate risk and emissions management.  This amounts to a “manage-
ment’s discussion and analysis” of greenhouse gas emissions.  Because 
investors are unlikely to have the ability to interpret raw emissions data, 
management should interpret the data for investors, in language in-
vestors can understand.  Instead of investors approximating the risk, 
management should describe that risk in a clear and straightforward 
manner, incorporating emissions data to illustrate the analyses.  By ana-
logy, this reader-friendly approach was the one taken in the 2006 
executive compensation disclosure rules adopted by the SEC.181  It 
would also be useful for this reader-friendly discussion and analysis to 
 178. Id. § 229.101(a).  Smaller reporting companies need only look back three years.  
Id. § 229.101(b). 
 179. However, the SEC does “encourage” projections.  Id. 
 180. § 229.303(c); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2007).  Companies 
providing projections are also advised to provide a set of assumptions and explanations 
describing the limitations of those projections.  17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3).  Projections 
significantly increase the burden on the reporting company. 
 181. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-8732A (Nov. 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final.2006 
/33-8732a.pdf. 
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appear separately from the financial MD&A already required in the 
annual reports.182 
C. Category 3: Physical Risks 
CERES states as part of its recommended disclosure that the 
physical risks associated with climate change be included in company 
reporting. 
 
CERES encourages companies to “analyze and disclose material, 
physical effects that climate change may have on the company’s 
business and its operations, including their supply chain.”  This 
analysis should describe how climate affects the operations generally, 
and should take into account changed weather patterns, increases in 
sea levels, availability of water, global warming and the potential 
health issues affecting the workforce.  CERES also asks for a descrip-
tion of how the company intends to adapt to those physical risks, 
including a cost estimate of the adaptation.183 
 
The CERES recommendations are more detailed, but not dissimilar 
to the request in the Climate Risk Petition regarding physical risks.  The 
recommendations are appropriately tied to the materiality standard.  In 
that regard, they reflect a company’s existing responsibilities under 
Items 101 and 503(c) of Regulation S-K.184  Because the physical risks 
will vary from company to company, the disclosure of those risks must 
necessarily be framed in a broad fashion. 
Mandatory disclosure of physical risks should follow the standard 
in the CERES recommendations, including the existing materiality 
standard under the securities laws.  While this may appear to require 
companies to do what they are already required to do, the specific delin-
eation of physical risks from climate change ought to highlight the issue 
for companies.  According to CERES, only one-third of the information 
 
 182. The SEC should consider whether smaller reporting companies should be 
exempt from the emissions disclosure altogether, or whether the look back period 
should be shorter than for larger issuers.  Since smaller reporting companies are exempt 
from including financial statements and have reduced MD&A requirements, it is 
probably appropriate to omit this item from their mandatory disclosure.  See supra notes 
36, 177-79 and accompanying text. 
 183. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 23. 
 184. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text. 
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investors want from companies regarding physical risks is actually 
disclosed.185  If physical risks of climate change are specifically identi-
fied as an item for mandatory disclosure, that fraction is likely to rise.  In 
addition, if a company discloses no physical risks associated with cli-
mate change, investors can take more comfort that the risks are not 
material – as opposed to the current situation, where investors may 
believe the absence of disclosure means climate change risks may have 
been overlooked or under-investigated by management. 
D. Category 4: Regulatory Risks 
According to the CERES Report, investors want to see known 
trends, commitments and uncertainties associated with climate change 
that may affect the financial or operating condition of the company.186  
As part of that consideration, investors are interested in how govern-
mental climate change regulations contribute to the financial and 
operating condition. 
 
CERES requests disclosure of all greenhouse gas regulations 
imposed in all the countries where a company operates, and an esti-
mate of the impact of those regulations.  It also requests projected 
carbon costs of meeting specified emissions reductions by 2015.  
Finally, it requests scenario planning, by which companies define “a 
limited number of plausible greenhouse gas regulatory scenarios” and 
describe the effect on the company and shareholder value, including 
in quantitative terms.187 
 
Much of the CERES recommendation is covered by Item 303 of 
Regulation S-K in management’s discussion and analysis of the com-
pany’s financial condition.188  Governmental regulation that has a mater-
ial effect on the company’s operations and financial condition is a rou-
tine subject in that section of the periodic reports.  Several of the CERES 
recommendations go beyond descriptions of risks, however. 
The CERES recommendation for a list of all greenhouse gas 
regulations in every relevant country is a fine subject for voluntary dis-
closure, but inappropriate for mandatory disclosure.  Such a list should 
 
 185. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 23. 
 186. Id. at 27. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2007). 
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be subject to materiality standards.  In addition, the CERES recommen-
dation that companies disclose the cost of emissions reductions at speci-
fied percentages by 2015 provides investors with useful information, but 
not of the type appropriate for mandatory disclosure.  The SEC does not 
require companies to make forecasts or projections.189  Therefore, re-
quiring companies to make forecasts in connection with mandatory dis-
closure of climate change risks would likely be enough to prevent any 
mandatory disclosure rules from passing muster.  The same can be 
claimed of the CERES-recommended “scenario planning.” 
A more appropriate approach in the mandatory disclosure context 
would be for the SEC to highlight in its guidance or rules the potential 
materiality of government regulations associated with climate change 
issues.  Like the disclosure of physical risks, the specific mention of cli-
mate change regulation in SEC guidance or rules ought to cause com-
panies to improve upon their current disclosure of these regulatory 
risks.190  Whether a company chooses to forecast emissions reductions 
or the effects of various scenarios ought to be voluntary, and subject to 
forward-looking statement safe harbors.191 
E. Plain English Disclosure 
Certain portions of a written prospectus, required to be delivered in 
connection with the issuance of securities, must comply with the SEC’s 
so-called “Plain English” rules.192  The Plain English rules are designed 
to make the information in the prospectus – particularly in the risk 
factors section of the prospectus – more accessible to investors.193  The 
Plain English rules include six basic principles: 
 
 
 189. See id. § 229.10(b). 
 190. CERES reports that less than half of the responding companies provided any 
regulatory risks associated with climate change at all.  CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 
27. 
 191. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(c); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2007). 
 192. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d). 
 193. Id.  In a more general way, Rule 421(b) requires that the entire prospectus be 
clear, concise and understandable.  17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b).  The Plain English rules 
originally applied only to certain portions of prospectuses and to risk factor disclosures.  
However, the SEC later applied the Plain English rules to the executive compensation 
disclosure items required in the periodic reports.  Executive Compensation and Related 
Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-8732A (Nov. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf. 
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s well. 
 
• Shorter sentences; 
• Everyday language and elimination of ambiguity to 
the extent possible; 
• Elimination of passive voice; 
• Graphical or tabular presentation of material, particu-
larly when the material is complex; 
• Avoidance of legal or business jargon and technical 
terms; and 
• Avoidance of multiple negatives.194 
 
The disclosure of legal matters – and most other subjects in securi-
ties filings – is written primarily by lawyers and features legal jargon, 
passive voice and ambiguous writing.195  The SEC’s Plain English rules 
seek to curtail those tendencies in favor of a more understandable way of 
communicating with the investing public.196  Disclosure systems achieve 
their goals only if the information is described in a clear fashion and in 
such a way that the investors can understand.197 
The disclosure of climate change risk will likely be written with the 
aid of scientists and will likely include specialized terminology and 
other unique features associated with the technical writing commonly 
utilized by the scientific community.  Because of the complexity of cli-
mate change risk, particularly GHG emissions data, the mandatory 
disclosure of emissions data should follow a management’s discussion 
and analysis approach, as mentioned earlier.198  In particular, this 
climate change risk MD&A would benefit from Plain English; without 
it, investors are unlikely to understand the disclosure.  Of course, the 
Plain English rules would be useful for the other elements of proposed 
climate change risk disclosure, a
Plain English is particularly important as investors rely less on 
intermediaries to make their investment decisions.199  Individual invest-
 194. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d)(2) (2007). 
 195. See Ripken, supra note 92, at 186; see also, BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL 
WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH 24-25, 34, 37 (2001). 
 196. See § 230.421(d). 
 197. Ripken, supra note 92, at 146. 
 198. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text. 
 199. Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1106 (2007); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal 
Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 135, 166-70 (2002). 
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erload. 
 
ors are increasingly doing their own research and making their own 
judgments about investments, without a stock broker or financial adviser 
to help them interpret the data.200  Without a layer of expertise between 
the investor and the company, disclosure of complex and highly scien-
tific data is potentially less effective.201  Applying the Plain English 
rules to climate change risk disclosure would help alleviate the potential 
for investors to misunderstand the disclosure, or simply tune it out 
because of information ov
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although there may be some fear that mandating climate change 
risk disclosure in securities filings will undermine voluntary reporting 
through other outlets, such as GRI and the Carbon Disclosure Project, 
the disclosure proposed in this Article is largely consistent with those 
reporting systems.  Companies would not be engaging in duplication of 
effort, and with electronic filing available in most of those systems, 
filing in two or three locations should not be burdensome.  At most, any 
duplication of effort would be in applying Plain English to the otherwise 
raw data that might be disclosed through other systems.  No doubt plain 
writing would be useful even when reporting in the voluntary systems. 
It is simply too easy to argue that mandatory climate change risk 
disclosure will be prohibitively expensive.  All disclosure entails some 
level of expense.  The proposed mandatory disclosure guidelines in this 
Article ought to involve no more expense than the disclosure required by 
other reporting systems.  Importantly, despite the cost factor, climate 
change risk disclosure does not have to be a negative proposition for 
companies. Executives who embrace the requirements and produce 
timely, accurate and comprehensive disclosures will likely find them-
selves in a better position relative to their competitors, and subsequently 
will be rewarded by shareholders and potential investors.  Transparency 
is a powerful force behind the Green Wave, and expectations rise daily. . 
. .  Environmental reports are a powerful tool to build trust with all 
stakeholders.”202  Not only does environmental reporting build trust with 
investors and other stakeholders, the failure to provide the disclosure 
introduces a shame factor that may be even more powerful.  Moreover, 
climate change concerns are growing among the populace every day, not 
 200. See Dalley, supra note 199, at 1105-06. 
 201. See id. 
 202. ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 13, at 228. 
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just investors.  A company’s employees are increasingly likely to be 
interested in, and even excited about, climate change initiatives.  Rather 
than seeing them as an unnecessary burden, employees likely will be 
proud to be part of such a corporate culture. 
Some will no doubt object that climate change risk disclosure is 
merely a system to effect regulation on issues of climate change, and an 
inefficient one.203  Whether mandatory securities law disclosure ought to 
have substantive regulatory goals is the subject of debate.204  On the 
topic of climate change risk disclosure, however, it should be enough 
that investors are clamoring for information as part of their decision-
making processes.  Mandatory disclosure need not be based solely on 
financial impact, but also can be geared towards providing investors 
with more information by which to make decisions about company 
management.205 
The mandatory disclosure rules proposed in this Article need not 
provide a substantive solution to global warming, nor even a perfect 
means of obtaining all relevant information about climate change risk 
disclosure.  Elected bodies have the power to enact global warming 
legislation to regulate directly, and increasing public pressure will 
motivate the elected.  In the interim, if mandatory securities law dis-
closure can provide investors with meaningful and useful climate change 
risk information to assist them in their investment decisions, it is a nice 
secondary effect if mandatory disclosure helps motivate more positive 
corporate attitudes towards global warming until appropriate regulatory 
legislation arrives. 
 203. See, e.g., David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational 
Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 380 (2005).  
Although Professor Case believes disclosure is an important regulatory tool, he is 
skeptical about whether the securities laws can serve as a “comprehensive informational 
regulatory” source because of what he characterizes as the SEC’s “troubled record on 
enforcing existing environmental disclosure requirements.”  Id. at 410.  However, 
assuming arguendo that Professor Case is correct, a ramped up disclosure scheme for 
global warming issues may still be a useful tool, even if it is not comprehensive. 
 204. See, e.g., Dalley, supra note 199, and the sources cited therein; Ripken, supra 
note 92; Williams, supra note 59, at 1209-35; Karen Bubna-Litic, Environmental 
Reporting as a Communications Tool: A Question of Enforcement, 20 J. ENVTL. L. 69 
(2008) (examining whether mandatory environmental reporting in Australia and 
Norway translates into better corporate decision making on environmental matters). 
 205. See Williams, supra note 59, at 1204-07; supra notes 59-66 and accompanying 
text. 
